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ABSTRACT
Policy towards speculative bubbles is examined in a model of a ￿nite horizon
￿greater fool￿ bubble, with rational agents, asymmetric information and short-sales
constraints. This model permits the use of standard tools of comparative dynamics
and welfare economics to analyze bubble policies.
Government policy is modeled as de￿ating overpriced assets by revealing infor-
mation about this overpricing. We assume in this paper that the central bank only
de￿ates assets if they are, in fact, overpriced. However, the central bank is never the
only one to know that assets are overpriced.
In this environment, a policy rule of de￿ating overpriced assets also in￿uences
expectations in states of the world where the central bank does nothing. That is,
if the central bank is following a bubble-bursting rule, then the market interprets
inaction as an implicit endorsement of asset prices, which raises these prices. This can
reduce the lemons problem caused by asymmetric information, if prices rise because the
policy protects uninformed buyers from ￿bad sellers￿ who know assets are overpriced.
However, if the central bank only de￿ates ￿strong bubbles,￿ where all investors already
know the asset is overpriced, then inaction raises prices because bad sellers become
more con￿dent, and this tends to make the lemons problem worse.
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1Asset prices have ￿uctuated wildly in recent years, and many have attributed these
￿uctuations to asset price bubbles (Higgins and Osler, 1997, Shiller, 2000, 2007, Ofek
and Richardson, 2003).1 There has also been a heated debate about whether central
banks should try to de￿ate these bubbles (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999, 2001, Cecchetti
and coauthors, 2000, 2003, Bordo and Jeanne, 2002, Hunter, et al. 2003, Bean, 2004,
Mishkin, 2007). During the Internet boom, for example, the Economist (1998) opined
that ￿the Fed made a mistake in not raising interest rates last year to let some air
out of the bubble,￿ and again, during the recent housing boom, the Economist (2007)
complained that ￿if the Fed should anticipate the economic consequences of a de￿ating
bubble, why should it not anticipate the consequences of an in￿ating one?￿
The Economist￿s position seems sensible, assuming the Fed can identify bubbles,
since it is presumably a good idea to restore asset prices to reasonable levels. Of course,
the Fed may not be able to identify bubbles. However, central bankers also seem to
see additional complications in bubble-bursting policy. In particular, they often worry
about the eﬀects such policies would have on expectations. For example, in the March
30, 1999 Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting (p. 66), President Jordan
of the Cleveland Fed worried about even being perceived as trying to burst bubbles:
￿It is also true, in view of the stock market ￿nally closing above 10,000 yesterday,
that a tightening step could easily be interpreted ￿ unfortunately, and in my view
wrongly ￿ that we considered that undesirable and we reacted to it. What is troubling
a b o u tt h a ti st h a ti tl e a d st ot h ei m p l i c a t i o nt h a tw eh a v et ow a i tu n t i lg r o w t hs l o w s
sharply and the stock market drops and then it will be safe to raise rates. [Laughter]￿
More speci￿cally, central bankers have worried that, if they pursue antibubble
policies, but their policy actions are insuﬃciently aggressive, then this may only en-
courage bubbles. For example, in the May 19, 1998 FOMC meeting (pp. 84-85), Alan
1 Of course, there are strong disagreements on whether bubbles even exist. See
Kindleberger (2000) and Garber (2000) among many others.
2Greenspan suggested that
￿[t]he more interesting question is whether, even if we were to decide we had a
bubble and we wanted to let the air out of it, we would be able to do it. ... we have to
be very wary of the notion that a small 25 or 50 basis point move could permanently
unwind this bubble. Unquestionably, it will do so for a short period of time, but it may
then merely set the stage for a further rise that may in fact be highly destabilizing.￿
As Schlesinger (1999) put it, ￿if we tried￿ to burst a bubble ￿the odds are we would
either fail ￿ which would only embolden the partygoers further ￿o rw ew o u l dh a v et o
destroy the dance hall to succeed￿ (emphasis added). Along the same lines, William
White of the Bank for International Settlemen t ss u g g e s t st h a t￿ [ e ] a c ht i m es h o r tr a t e s
rise and the bubble continues to expand, ... the market is con￿rmed in its belief in a
￿new era￿ ￿ (Cecchetti et al., 2000, p. 108).
By a similar logic, if investors are expecting the central bank to move against a
bubble, but it does not do so, then this may be taken as an implicit endorsement of
asset prices, and so, may drive prices up further. Thus, policy makers may be reluctant
to become ￿arbiter[s] of security speculation or values￿ (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963,
p. 290, quoting the Federal Reserve Board). That is, central bankers may be concerned
that, if they adopt a bubble bursting policy rule, then any action ￿ or inaction ￿w i l l
tend to move markets.2
Unfortunately, it has been diﬃcult for economic theory to address these issues,
since there have been few theoretical models in which to examine the welfare im-
plications of policies towards bubbles. Standard models of rational bubbles use an
in￿nite-horizon framework, where agents hold overpriced assets because they believe
2 In addition, policy makers worry that, in the presence of bubbles, asset prices
become fragile, so policy eﬀects are unpredictable. As Mishkin (2007), p. 399-400,
explains, ￿[t]he eﬀect of interest rates on asset-price bubbles is highly uncertain,￿ and
raising rates ￿may cause a bubble to burst more severely ...￿ Thus ￿it is heroic to
expect the tools of monetary policy to work normally in abnormal conditions.￿
3these assets will be overpriced forever in expected value.3 These models, however,
violate market participants￿ intuition that bubbles eventually burst.4 In addition,
bubbles generally improve welfare in these models.5
For these reasons, most studies of bubble policy simply assume an exogenous gap
between the market price of an asset and its fundamental value (Kent and Lowe, 1997,
Bernanke and Gertler, 1999, 2001, Cecchetti and coauthors, 2000, 2003, and Dupor,
2005). However, since overpricing is exogenous in these models, it is impossible to
capture the eﬀects of policy on expectations and overpricing, discussed above.
These models are therefore vulnerable to the Lucas Critique. Also, since the
process driving bubbles is never explicitly modeled in these papers, it is impossible to
relate the welfare eﬀects of bubble policy to the market failures that generate bubbles.6
This paper therefore analyzes bubble policy using an explicit, fully endogenous
model of a bubble. Speci￿cally, we assume a ￿greater fool￿ model of asset price bubbles,
3 See Samuelson (1958), Blanchard and Watson (1982), Tirole (1985), Santos and
Woodford (1997), or LeRoy (2004).
4 Warren Buﬀett (2001) describes investors in bubble markets as resembling ￿Cin-
derella at the ball. They know that overstaying the festivities ... will eventually bring
on pumpkins and mice￿ but they ￿all plan to leave just seconds before midnight.￿ Un-
fortunately, ￿the clocks have no hands.￿ Similarly, Kindleberger (2000, p. 15) suggests
that ￿the word ... bubble foreshadows the bursting￿ (emphasis his).
5 For example, in Samuelson (1958), a bubble in ￿at currency makes it possible for
people to save for old age. In Tirole (1985), a bubble in an intrinsically useless asset
allows people to save without wasting resources overproducing capital. It is unlikely
that recent boom-bust cycles in asset prices served either of these functions.
6 Gai et al. (2004) endogenize their bubble, using the Miller (1977) model of dis-
agreement in the context of short sales constraints. However, they do not do a full
welfare analysis of their model.
4where investors hold overpriced assets i nh o p e so fs e l l i n gt h e mt os o m e o n ee l s e￿a
￿greater fool￿ ￿ before asset prices collapse.7
Many recent bubble models have a greater fool ￿avor (Harrison and Kreps, 1978,
Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003, Allen and Gorton, 1993, Allen and Gale, 2000, Allen et
al., 1993, Conlon, 2004, Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2003, Doblas-Madrid, 2008). Also,
greater fool models are consistent with evidence that asset price booms put pressure
on brokers￿ loans (Rappoport and White, 1993, 1994) and put options (Bates, 1991),
since these suggest that some agents anticipate a crash. In addition, stocks which are
expensive to short have lower expected returns (Jones and Lamont, 2002), which is also
consistent with a greater fool dynamic. Finally, Ofek and Richardson (2003), Temin
and Voth (2004), Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Dhar and Goetzmann (2005)
argue that many traders followed greater fool strategies during the South Sea bubble
and the Internet boom.
It is diﬃcult, however, to capture this greater fool dynamic in standard economic
models, where all agents are perfectly rational. Fortunately, a major breakthrough in
modeling greater-fool bubbles with rational agents was achieved a decade ago by Allen,
Morris and Postlewaite (1993). These authors consider a ￿nite horizon model, so any
bubbles must eventually burst, consistent with the intuition of market participants.
They then use asymmetric information and short sale constraints to model a ￿strong
bubble,￿ where everyone knows that an asset is overpriced. Agents hold an asset
they know is overpriced because, with asymmetric information, no one knows whether
anyone else also knows the asset is overpriced. Thus, everyone hopes to sell the asset
7 Kindleberger (2000), traces an explicit statement of this theory as far back as 1890,
when the Chicago Tribune editorialized about ￿men who bought property at prices they
knew perfectly well were ￿ctitious, but who ... knew that some still greater fool could
be depended on to take the property oﬀ their hands and leave them with a pro￿t￿ (p.
111; see also Chancellor, 2000, p. 95).
5to someone else, yielding a greater fool bubble.
Unfortunately, the Allen et al. example is too complicated to work with easily.
Recently, Conlon (2004) simpli￿ed the Allen et al. approach, making it more straight-
forward to analyze issues related to asset price bubbles.
We therefore analyze asset de￿ation policies in a simpli￿ed Allen et al. (1993)
greater fool model. Welfare analysis is especially convenient in greater fool models
with rational agents since standard tools of welfare economics then apply. In par-
ticular, welfare analysis can be based on utility functions which agents themselves
maximize. However, while rational bubble models are therefore a natural place to be-
gin, models based on irrationality, such as Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Abreu
and Brunnermeier (2003), are also important topics of future research.8
Our bubble is structured as follows. First, there are several possible states of the
world, and agents have incomplete information about which one of these states is the
true state. In some states, half the agents are ￿good sellers,￿ whose asset might be
valuable, and half are ￿buyers.￿ In other states, half are ￿bad sellers,￿ who know their
asset is worthless, and half are buyers. In still other states, all agents are bad sellers.
8 Asymmetric information models, such as the one we consider, are especially well
suited to study the instabilities of concern to policy makers, discussed above (Allen et
al., 2006). In addition, actual investors, even if irrational, are smart enough to analyze
and reassess their environments, and such reassessments are clearly central to models
of bubbles and crashes. Again, asymmetric information models are ideal for capturing
such nontrivial investor information processing and reassessments (see, e.g., Abreu and
Brunnermeier, 2003, and Doblas-Madrid, 2008).
As explained in Section 4, the present model can also be reinterpreted to incor-
porate the overcon￿dence assumption of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). The fact that
a similar framework can treat models with or without such irrationality is important,
since it provides economists who prefer rational models, and those who prefer behav-
ioral models, with a common framework in which to analyze bubbles. This is valuable,
since it is clearly still too early in the development of this important ￿eld to settle
de￿nitively on one model to the exclusion of others.
6Buyers are willing to buy because they do not know whether sellers are good or
bad. In addition, there are nontrivial gains from trade if the seller is good ￿ due to
hedging, say ￿ which compensate for the danger of buying from a bad seller. It is
therefore rational for these buyers to risk becoming the ￿greater fools￿ that bad sellers
hope to sell to. That is, bad sellers create a lemons problem, since they cause buyers
to trust good sellers less (Akerlof, 1970), but gains from trade are large enough to at
least partially overcome this lemons problem. A strong bubble in the sense of Allen et
al. (1993) is then a state of the world in which bad sellers hope they are facing these
greater-fool buyers, but they are actually just facing other bad sellers.
I nt h ep r e s e n tm o d e l ,t h eo n l yp o l i c yt o o lc a p a b l eo fi n ￿uencing asset prices is
the release of information. This is because the discount rate is ￿xed (at zero), and
the elasticity of demand for assets is in￿nite, so agents bid prices up to the certainty
equivalent of expected future prices, regardless of supply. Open market operations,
for example, would have no eﬀect here, beyond the information revealed about central
bank beliefs. We therefore simply represent the central bank￿s policy as the release of
this information, and ignore other aspects of central bank policy.9
We must then specify what the central bank knows. This paper assumes that the
9 As Stefan Ingves (2007), the governor of the Swedish central bank, explains in the
case of Swedish policy, ￿when we observe long periods of high growth rates in asset
prices and debt, growth rates that appear to be unsustainable in the long run, our
view is that it is not reasonable to completely ignore￿ this. ￿What this view has meant
in practice is fairly marginal changes in the timing of our interest rate changes, and
substantial public oral and written focus on the issue￿ (p. 433-34; emphasis added; note
also that Sweden￿s policy is not without its critics: see Mishkin, 2007, p. 397). Allen
et al. (2006) and Gai et al. (2004) also consider models where announcements matter.
In addition, if information is important, interest rate policy itself may serve largely as
a signal of central bank information. Of course, the announcer in the present paper
could be some other government agency, such as the SEC or the Treasury, rather than
the central bank.
7central bank only believes an asset is overpriced if it really is overpriced. Thus, the
central bank is never wrong in believing an asset is overpriced. However, we assume
that the central bank only knows an asset is overpriced if some private agents also know
this. That is, the central bank is never the only one to know the asset is overpriced.
Within this context, we consider two extreme information structures for the central
bank. In the ￿rst, the central bank is relatively smart in the sense that it can know
an asset is overpriced even if some private agents do not know this. If the central
bank then de￿ates these overpriced assets, we call this a policy of ￿general de￿ation
of overpriced assets.￿ Note that this is not yet the bursting of an Allen et al. strong
bubble, since some agents ￿ buyers, say ￿ may not know the asset is overpriced.
In this case, since the central bank may know more than some buyers, a policy
of general de￿ation of overpriced assets can protect these buyers from bad sellers who
know the asset is worthless. This raises the price received by good sellers, who believe
the asset may be valuable, and so, reduces the lemons problem.
This extreme case is contrasted to the opposite extreme, i.e., bubble bursting
proper. In this case the central bank only knows an asset is overpriced if there is a
strong bubble, so all private agents also know the asset is overpriced. That is, the
central bank is no better informed about fundamentals than any private agent.
Thus, bubble bursting announcements reveal nothing to private agents about fun-
damentals. However, the central bank can make information about fundamentals com-
mon knowledge.S p e c i ￿cally, since the central bank only knows an asset is overpriced
if everyone else does, the central bank￿s announcement tells bad sellers that all other
agents are also bad sellers.
A policy of bursting bubbles therefore protects these bad sellers from each other.
Thus, in states of the world where the central bank turns out not to announce a bubble,
bad sellers become more con￿dent of selling the asset, exacerbating the lemons problem
8faced by good sellers. This negative eﬀect can outweigh the positive eﬀect of preventing
bad sellers from wasting resources in bubble states.
Thus, while bubbles may be a symptom of asymmetric information, which is a bad
thing, eliminating this particular symptom may make the underlying problem worse.
Note that the ￿general de￿ation￿ case above may resemble the Cecchetti et al.
view, since the central bank knows relatively more. On the other hand, the ￿bubble
bursting￿ case may more closely resemble the Bernanke and Gertler view, since the
central bank knows very little. Thus, these extreme cases should illuminate the major
issues which would also arise in less extreme intermediate cases. However, other cases,
such as where the central bank sometimes wrongly believes that an asset is overpriced,
are also of interest (see Kai and Conlon, 2008).10
In addition, this paper focuses only on the microeconomic aspects of bubble policy.
Future work should study endogenous bubbles in a macroeconomic context, to shed
light on their role in countercyclical policy (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999, 2001, Bordo
and Jeanne, 2002, Cecchetti and coauthors, 2000, 2003).
In the present model, the potential distortion is a misallocation of produced capital
￿ e.g., a stock market boom may encourage excessive investment in anticipation of an
IPO. This has, in fact, been a major concern of policy makers. For example, at the
July 1-2, 1997 FOMC meeting, President Minehan of the Boston Fed argued, ￿[w]e
all know what happens when asset bubbles occur in ￿nancial and real estate markets.
... Banks begin lending for any project, viable or not. Everyone who can pick up a
10 Of course, opinions diﬀer sharply about whether central bank concerns about
overpricing are ever justi￿ed. However, since bubble bursting policy is one of the most
widely discussed issues in central banking, it is clearly important, at least hypotheti-
cally, to consider the theoretical issues surrounding this important debate. Of course,
it should be noted that, even if central bank announcements do move prices, this may
be because they signal future policy intentions, not actual information about assets.
9hammer becomes a construction worker￿ (p. 122). Similarly, Swedish central bank
governor Stefan Ingves (2007) argues that anti-bubble policy ￿can dampen the eﬀects
of the unmotivated price change on the real economy and thereby prevent an ineﬃcient
allocation of resources￿ (p. 437). Of course,m o d e l sw i t ho t h e rt y p e so fd i s t o r t i o nw o u l d
also be an important topic of future research.11
Finally, this paper examines policy in the simplest possible models. For example,
we limit our analysis to a three-period world, with a bubble only in period one. This
makes the timing of policy very rigid. In particular, ￿bubble bursting￿ really means
bubble prevention ￿ i.e., prevention of the ￿rst-period bubble. Thus, we cannot study
the eﬀects of delayed policy actions. While our results should generalize, it is important
to determine what other issues also arise in more complicated models.
The next section introduces the basic asset market model. Section 2 studies general
de￿ation of overpriced assets while Section 3 considers bubble bursting proper. Section
4b r i e ￿y discusses agent irrationality and Section 5 concludes.
1. PRELIMINARIES
This section presents the basic asset market model. The framework is similar to
Milgrom and Stokey (1982), Allen eta l .( 1 9 9 3 )a n dC o nlon (2004).
There are two risk neutral individuals in the market, Ellen and Frank, and a ￿nite
set of states of the world, Ω. A typical state of the world is ω ∈ Ω. We also use symbols
11 There has been some disagreement as to whether managers increase investment in
response to overpriced assets. Blanchard et al. (1993, p. 115) ￿nd that overpricing plays
￿at most a limited role in aﬀecting investment decisions,￿ while Chirinko and Schaller
(2001), Panageas (2003), and Gilchrist, et al. (2005) ￿nd stronger evidence that asset
overpricing encourages overinvestment. In Dupor (2005), like here, anti-bubble policy
prevents bubbles from leading to overinvestment, though, since his bubble is exogenous,
his model does not capture the lemons eﬀect. See also Bolton, et al. (2005) for a model
where managers encourage a bubble and then overinvest.
10such as b, eB, fG
2 , etc., to denote states of the world. To make the modeling strategy as
conservative as possible, assume that Ellen and Frank have a common prior probability
distribution, π(ω), over Ω.
In addition, Ellen and Frank have state-dependent marginal utilities, MUE(ω)
and MUF(ω). Here MUE(ω)a n dMUF(ω)m a yd i ﬀer because Ellen and Frank have
diﬀerent underlying future wealths in diﬀerent states of the world, due, say, to risky
future labor income. However, the marginal utility of wealth in each state is at least
locally constant, independent of the outcome of trade in this market. That is, MUE(ω)
and MUF(ω) depend only on ω, and not on the wealth obtained from this market.
Thus, the utility function must be at least piecewise linear (see Allen et al., 1993). Let
ME(ω)=
MUE(ω)π(ω)
!
ω!inΩ MUE(ω )π(ω )
and MF(ω)=
MUF(ω)π(ω)
!
ω!inΩ MUF(ω )π(ω )
be shadow state prices indicating the ex ante value that Ellen and Frank attach to
a unit of consumption in state ω. W ec o n d e n s es u m sl i k eME(ω1)+... + ME(ωk)a s
ME(ω1, ..., ωk) for short, and similarly for MF(ω1, ..., ωk).
Note that ME(ω) is the Arrow-Debreu price of a dollar in state ω,t h a tw o u l d
prevail in an economy with representative agent Ellen, and similarly for MF(ω) (Arrow,
1964). Thus, ME(•)a n dMF(•) resemble Equivalent Martingale probability measures
(Harrison and Kreps, 1979). This means that Ellen￿s (Frank￿s) willingness to pay for
an asset is simply given by the asset￿s conditional expected next-period value, based
on the arti￿cial probabilities ME(•)( r e s p e c t i v e l y ,MF(•)). See (3) and (4) below.
The market lasts for three periods, denoted t =1 , 2, 3, but there is no discounting.
There is a riskless asset (money), and a risky asset. A unit of the risky asset ultimately,
in period 3, pays a single dividend of d(ω) in state ω.
This paper allows the risky asset to be produced. For example, oﬃce buildings
can be constructed and entrepreneurs can expand their ￿rms in anticipation of an IPO.
11Thus, in certain states, ω ∈ ΩE, Ellen can produce an amount of the asset, a, at cost
c(a), with c(0) = 0. In other states she cannot produce. Similarly, Frank can only
produce in states ω ∈ ΩF,a l s oa tc o s tc(a). All production occurs before period t =1 ,
but after the central bank makes any announcements. For the ￿xed endowment case,
c(a) is zero up to the endowment point, and in￿nity thereafter. The initial amounts
of the risky asset, after production, are denoted by aE
0 (ω)a n daF
0 (ω), for Ellen and
Frank, respectively. Of course, aE
0 (ω)=0f o rω / ∈ ΩE, and similarly for Frank. Ellen
a n dF r a n ka l s ob e g i nw i t hs t a t e - d e p e n d e n te n d o w m e n t so fm o n e y ,mE
0 (ω)a n dmF
0 (ω).
Denote Ellen￿s and Frank￿s net sales of the risky asset in period t by xE
t (ω)a n d
xF
t (ω). Thus, if aE
t (ω)a n daF
t (ω) are their holdings of the risky asset at the end of
period t,t h e naE
t (ω)=aE
t−1(ω) − xE
t (ω) for Ellen, and similarly for Frank. In the
same way, if mE
t (ω)a n dmF
t (ω) are Ellen￿s and Frank￿s money holdings at the end of
period t,a n dpt(ω) is the price of the risky asset in period t and state ω,t h e nmE
t (ω)
= mE
t−1(ω)+pt(ω)xE
t (ω) for Ellen, and similarly for Frank. Assume that there are no
short sales of the risky asset, so aE
t (ω) ≥ 0a n daF
t (ω) ≥ 0 for all ω and t.12
Assume that the price of the consumption good, in terms of money, is ￿xed at one.
Since marginal utilities are locally constant, the overall expected payoﬀ to Ellen, say,
12 Many models of asset markets assume short-sale constraints (Harrison and Kreps,
1978, Tirole, 1982, Allen et al., 1993). As Shiller (2000), p. 244, explains, ￿[w]hen a
ridiculous fad develops for some stocks ... most investors ... do no more than avoid those
stocks: They do not take the kind of massive short positions ... that would fully oﬀset
the overly exuberant prices that the fad investors would create.￿ See also Ofek and
Richardson (2003) and Jones and Lamont (2002) who relate short selling costs to asset
overpricing. More generally, if short sales are especially diﬃcult in certain markets,
e.g., real estate, then bubbles may be more likely in those markets.
Put options may play a role similar to short sales. Asquith et al. (2004), p. 30,
however, argue that ￿[h]edge fund managers and other practitioners involved in short
selling maintain that they can not eﬀectively use the options market. In interviews,
they repeatedly claimed that the options market provides less liquidity and is more
expensive than the short sales market when trying to establish a large position.￿
12based on the value of her portfolio in period 3, is then
Eπ"
MUE(ω)[mE
3 (ω)+aE
3 (ω)d(ω) − c(aE
0 (ω))]
#
, (1)
where Eπ is the expectation with respect to the prior π, and similarly for Frank.
The models below have rich information structures. As is common in such models,
we represent agents￿ information using information partitions.13 A partition of the set
Ω is a set of subsets, Si,o fΩ, such that the subsets are all disjoint (Si∩Sj = ∅ for i  = j),
but they cover Ω (∪iSi = Ω). The partition {Si} is an agent￿s information partition
if the agent knows which subset, Si, the true state is in, but she cannot distinguish
between diﬀerent elements of Si.F o r e x a m p l e ,i f ω1 is the actual state of the world,
and ω1 ∈ S3, say, then the agent knows that the state is in S3, but she does not know
whether the true state is ω1 or some other state, ω2,s a y ,i nS3. The subsets, Si,o f
an information partition are called ￿cells￿ or ￿information sets.￿ These information
partitions can represent rich information structures.14
13 See Milgrom and Stokey (1982). For expository treatments, see Huang and Litzen-
berger (1988), Binmore (1992), or Samuelson (2004).
14 As an example, suppose Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}, and assume that Ellen has an
information partition {E1,E 2} with E1 = {ω1, ω3} and E2 = {ω2, ω4}. This indicates
t h a t ,i ft h et r u es t a t eo ft h ew o r l di sω2, for example, then Ellen knows that either ω2
or ω4 is the true state, but she does not know which one.
Next let Frank￿s partition be {F1,F 2},w h e r eF1 = {ω1, ω2, ω3} and F2 = {ω4}.
Assume these partitions are ￿common knowledge,￿ so Ellen knows Frank￿s partition,
Frank knows Ellen￿s partition, Ellen knows that Frank knows Ellen￿s partition, and so
on. However, agents are not told the actual piece of information the other received.
This sort of common knowledge assumption is standard in the literature.
Suppose the true state is ω1. Then Ellen knows the state is one of ω1 or ω3.
Thus, Ellen knows the state is in Frank￿s cell F1 = {ω1, ω2, ω3},s os h ek n o w st h a t
Frank thinks the state might be ω2. Also, since Frank thinks the state might be ω2,h e
incorrectly thinks that Ellen might think the state might be ω4.T h u s ,E l l e nk n o w st h e
state is not ω4, but she also knows that Frank thinks she might think the state might
be ω4. This type of ￿higher order￿ thinking is essential for greater fool bubble models
13Ellen￿s and Frank￿s information partitions evolve over time as they get new infor-
mation, with their underlying information partitions in period t given by Et = {Eit}
and Ft = {Fit}. These partitions incorporate any previous information that Ellen
or Frank have (e.g., from ΩE, ΩF, mE
0 (ω)a n dmE
0 (ω)). They also become (at least
weakly) more informative over time, so Ellen and Frank do not forget. Ellen and Frank
can also learn from current and previous market prices. The partitions also incorporat-
ing this additional price information will be denoted by EP
t = {EP
it} and FP
t = {FP
it }.
Finally, assume that all information is revealed by period 3.
A competitive equilibrium in this market consists of a state-dependent pricing
function, pt(ω), and a pair of state-dependent net sales functions, xE
t (ω)a n dxF
t (ω),
for Ellen and Frank, such that:
(i) pt(ω) depends only on information possessed by Ellen or Frank at time t,i . e . ,
on information in the coarsest common re￿nement of the partitions Et and Ft,
(ii) each agent￿s net trades depend only on information he/she actually possesses
at the time of trade, so Ellen￿s (Frank￿s) net trades in period t depend on information
in her (his) price-re￿ned partition, EP
t (FP
t ),
(iii) the market clears, so xE
t (ω)+xF
t (ω) = 0, and
(iv) each agent￿s net trades are optimal, given his/her information, the set of state-
dependent prices, the short-sales constraints, and his/her (correct) beliefs about the
other￿s strategy rule.
Follow Allen et al. (1993) by saying that a strong bubble exists at a state, ω,i fa l l
agents know that the risky asset is overpriced for sure. Thus, if a strong bubble exists
at state ω and time t, then Ellen, say, knows that the asset is overpriced, so ω ∈ EP
it
implies that, for all ω  ∈ EP
it, pt(ω ) >d (ω ). That is, if the state is ω, Ellen might
(see Allen et al., 1993, Morris et al., 1995, Brunnermeier, 2001, or Conlon, 2004).
14not know that the state is ω, but she does know which cell, EP
it, ω i si n ,a n d ,f o revery
state, ω  in EP
it, the asset is overpriced. A similar condition must hold for Frank.
We next derive formulas for pt(ω), t =1 , 2, 3. For t = 3, price equals the dividend,
since both agents have complete information. This means that p3(ω)=d(ω).
To obtain p2(ω), suppose a buyer, Ellen say, is considering buying one more unit
of the risky asset at information set EP
i2 in period 2. Since EP
i2 incorporates price
information, p2(ω) will be constant on EP
i2. Denote this constant by p2.T h e ni fE l l e n
buys this unit, her expected utility will change by
∆EUE =
$
ω!∈EP
i2
MUE(ω )π(ω )d(ω ) −
$
ω!∈EP
i2
MUE(ω )π(ω )p2. (2)
This is the expected marginal utility, from dividends, of holding one more unit of the
a s s e ti np e r i o d3 ,m i n u st h ee x p e c t e d marginal utility cost of holding p2 units less
money, both at information set EP
i2.
Ellen buys if ∆EUE ≥ 0, but she has in￿nite demand if ∆EUE > 0. She therefore
buys a positive but ￿nite amount only if ∆EUE = 0. This yields
p2(ω)=
!
ω!∈EP
i2 MUE(ω )π(ω )d(ω )
!
ω!∈EP
i2 MUE(ω )π(ω )
=
!
ω!∈EP
i2 ME(ω )d(ω )
!
ω!∈EP
i2 ME(ω )
(3)
for all ω ∈ EP
i2. This is the equilibrium period 2 price if Ellen is buying, or more
generally, if Ellen is not short-sale constrained. Similarly, if Ellen is not short-sale
c o n s t r a i n e di np e r i o d1a n di n f o r m a t i o ns e tEP
i1,t h e n
p1(ω)=
!
ω!∈EP
i1 ME(ω )p2(ω )
!
ω!∈EP
i1 ME(ω )
for all ω ∈ EP
i1. (4)
Similar formulas hold if Frank is not short-sale constrained. Note that (3) and (4) are
essentially conditional expectations, based on the arti￿cial probabilities ME(ω).
Finally, note that the elasticity of demand is in￿nite at the equilibrium price, so
expected consumer surplus must be zero. Expected welfare therefore simply equals the
appropriately weighted expected producer surplus.
152. GENERAL DEFLATION OF OVERPRICED ASSETS
This section presents a simple example of a bubble. It also examines a policy
of ￿general de￿ation of overpriced assets,￿ where, if any investors know an asset is
overpriced, then, with probability λ, the central bank also knows this, and announces
its information. This is not yet ￿bubble bursting,￿ since some investors may not know
the asset is overpriced. Thus, general de￿a t i o no fo v e r p r i c e da s s e t sc a np r o t e c tt h e s e
uninformed investors from the informed investors, and so, tends to increase welfare.
We ￿rst present the basic model and equilibrium, and then analyze policy.
2.A. Basic Setup and Equilibrium
We ￿rst give some intuition for the bubble model. There are two traders, Ellen
a n dF r a n k .I ns o m es t a t e so ft h ew o r l dE l l e ni sa￿ b a ds e l l e r ￿w h ow a n t st os e l lF r a n k
an asset she knows is worthless. In other states Ellen is a ￿good seller,￿ who believes
that the asset may be valuable, but is willingt os e l li tt oF r a n kb e c a u s eh ei sw i l l i n gt o
pay more for it than she is. Frank is willing to buy the asset from Ellen, even though
she might be a bad seller, because there are potential gains from trade if she is good,
and Frank cannot distinguish between states where Ellen is a good versus a bad seller.
Symmetrically, there are certain states in which Frank is a good or bad seller, and
Ellen is willing to buy in some of these states, since she cannot distinguish between
states where Frank is good versus bad. Final l y ,i nc e r t a i no ft h eb a ds t a t e s ,b o t hk n o w
the asset is worthless, but each is willing to hold it in the (mistaken) belief that he/she
will be able to sell it later. A strong bubble therefore exists in those states.
In certain of the bad states, the central bank also knows the asset is worthless.
This subsection assumes that the central bank does not reveal its information, while
the next subsection assumes the central bank announces these states if they occur.
Assume that there are twelve possible states of nature,
Ω = {b, bCB,e B,e B
CB,f B,f B
CB,e G
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 ,f G
1 ,f G
2 ,f G
3 }. (5)
16The letter b indicates a potential bubble state, while the letters e versus f indicate
whether Ellen alone or Frank alone can produce the asset in that state. Superscripts B
versus G indicate whether the seller is bad (so he/she knows the asset is worthless) or
good (so he/she thinks it might be valuable). Finally, the subscript CB indicates that
the central bank knows the asset is worthless in that state, and the subscripts on eG
i
and fG
i aﬀect the timing of information, as explained below. More speci￿cally, assume
Ellen (Frank) can produce the asset in states ω ∈ ΩE (ω ∈ ΩF), where
ΩE = {b, bCB,e B,e B
CB,e G
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 },
ΩF = {b, bCB,f B,f B
CB,f G
1 ,f G
2 ,f G
3 },
(6)
and the central bank knows whether or not the state of the world is in
ΩCB = {bCB,e B
CB,f B
CB}. (7)
Assume the asset only pays a nonzero dividend in states eG
3 and fG
3 ,a n dt h i s
dividend is d(eG
3 )=d(fG
3 )=d. Note that the dividend is zero in ΩCB.T h u s , i f
the central bank learns that ω ∈ ΩCB and announces this, this information becomes
common knowledge, and the price falls to zero. However, this subsection assumes that
the central bank does not make any announcements.
For simplicity, assume symmetry in probabilities and marginal utilities. Thus, for
probabilities assume π(eB)=π(fB), π(eB
CB)=π(fB
CB), and π(eG
i )=π(fG
i )f o ri =
1, 2, 3. Similarly, for marginal utilities assume symmetries such as MUE(b)=MUF(b),
MUE(eB)=MUF(fB), MUE(fG
i )=MUF(eG
i ), and so on. These symmetries imply
the following symmetries for the shadow state prices ME and MF:
ME(b)=MF(b),M E(bCB)=MF(bCB),M E(eB)=MF(fB),
ME(fB)=MF(eB),M E(eB
CB)=MF(fB
CB),M E(fB
CB)=MF(eB
CB),
ME(eG
i )=MF(fG
i ), and ME(fG
i )=MF(eG
i ),i =1 , 2, 3.
(8)
17We next indicate what Ellen and Frank know, using their information partitions,
Et = {Eit} and Ft = {Fit}. Let Ellen￿s underlying period 1 information partition be
EB
Seller = {b, bCB,e B,e B
CB},E G
Seller = {eG
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 },
EBuyer = {fB,f B
CB,f G
1 ,f G
2 ,f G
3 },
(9)
while Frank￿s underlying information partition is
FB
Seller = {b, bCB,f B,f B
CB},F G
Seller = {fG
1 ,f G
2 ,f G
3 }
FBuyer = {eB,e B
CB,e G
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 }.
(10)
These partitions are illustrated in Figure 1.
Note that we left the time subscript t =1o ﬀ of the information sets for simplicity.
Note also that Ellen can produce the risky asset in the cells EB
Seller and EG
Seller,a n d
Frank can produce it in the cells FB
Seller and FG
Seller. Thus, both agents know whether
or not they can produce the risky asset.
Figure 1: Information Partitions: Ellen￿s ￿ Solid Lines, Frank￿s ￿ Dashed Lines.
Dividend Paying States ￿ Dotted Lines.
The cell EB
Seller will contain states where Ellen is a bad seller, who hopes to sell
an asset she knows is worthless, and EG
Seller will contain states where Ellen is a good
seller, who hopes to sell an asset she thinks may be valuable, i.e., may pay a positive
18dividend. Also, note that Frank ￿ in cell FBuyer ￿ cannot distinguish between the good
states in EG
Seller, and two bad states, eB and eB
CB,f r o mEB
Seller. T h i si sw h yF r a n k
may be willing to buy from Ellen in states eB and eB
CB, where she is bad. Similarly,
Ellen may be willing to buy from Frank in states fB and fB
CB, where he is bad.
In period 2, both players learn the true state, ω,i fi ti sb, bCB, eG
1 ,o rfG
1 . Ellen￿s
and Frank￿s underlying information partitions in period 2 are therefore:
E0
12 = {b},E 0
22 = {bCB},E 0
32 = {eG
1 },E 0
42 = {fG
1 }
EB
Seller2 = {eB,e B
CB},E G
Seller2 = {eG
2 ,e G
3 },E Buyer2 = {fB,f B
CB,f G
2 ,f G
3 },
(11)
F0
12 = {b},F 0
22 = {bCB},F 0
32 = {fG
1 },F 0
42 = {eG
1 }
FB
Seller2 = {fB,f B
CB},F G
Seller2 = {fG
2 ,f G
3 },F Buyer2 = {eB,e B
CB,e G
2 ,e G
3 }.
(12)
Note that we include the time subscript t = 2. Also, in the cells E0
12, E0
22, E0
32, E0
42,
F0
12, F0
22, F0
32,a n dF0
42, it is common knowledge that the asset is worthless, so the price
will be zero. Thus, the only interesting cells are EB
Seller2, EG
Seller2,a n dEBuyer2 for
Ellen, and FB
Seller2, FG
Seller2,a n dFBuyer2 for Frank (see Figure 2). In period 3 Ellen
and Frank learn the true state no matter what it is.
Figure 2: The Interesting Period 2 Information Sets: Ellen￿s ￿ Solid Lines, Frank￿s ￿
Dashed Lines. Dividend Paying States ￿ Dotted Lines.
Recall that the asset only pays an o n z e r od i v i d e n di ns t a t e seG
3 and fG
3 .T h u s ,
when Ellen observes the event EB
Seller = {b, bCB,e B,e B
CB}, she knows that the asset is
19actually worthless, and when Frank observes the event FB
Seller = {b, bCB,f B,f B
CB},
he knows that the asset is worthless. This implies that, in states b and bCB, both
Ellen and Frank know that the asset is worthless, though neither knows that the other
knows. Thus, if the price of the asset is nevertheless positive in these states, this will
represent a strong bubble in the sense of Allen et al. (1993).
We now construct an equilibrium with a strong bubble in states b and bCB.T a b l e
1 presents the general pattern of prices in this equilibrium. Proposition 1 determines
equilibrium prices p1 and p2, and indicates the conditions needed to sustain this equilib-
rium. Throughout we focus primarily on the states b, bCB, eB, eB
CB and the eG
i ,w h e r e
Ellen hopes to sell to Frank. By symmetry (see (8)), the same results will automatically
apply to states where Frank hopes to sell to Ellen.
TABLE 1: EQUILIBRIUM PRICES
ω b bCB eB eB
CB fB fB
CB eG
1 eG
2 eG
3 fG
1 fG
2 fG
3
p1(ω) p1 p1 p1 p1 p1 p1 p1 p1 p1 p1 p1 p1
p2(ω) 0 0 p2 p2 p2 p2 0 p2 p2 0 p2 p2
p3(ω) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 d 0 0 d
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that ME and MF satisfy the three conditions
ME(eG
2 ,e G
3 )
ME(eG
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
=
ME(eB,e B
CB)
ME(b, bCB,e B,e B
CB)
, (13)
ME(eG
2 ,e G
3 )
ME(eG
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
≥
MF(eB,e B
CB,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
MF(eB,e B
CB,e G
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
, (14)
and
MF(eG
3 )
MF(eB,e B
CB,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
≥
ME(eG
3 )
ME(eG
2 ,e G
3 )
. (15)
Then the prices in Table 1 form an equilibrium, where p1 and p2 are given as
p1 =
ME(eG
2 ,e G
3 )
ME(eG
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
p2 (16)
20and
p2 =
MF(eG
3 )
MF(eB,e B
CB,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
d. (17)
Ellen and Frank produce a∗ in ΩE and ΩF, respectively, where a∗ = a∗(p1)s a t i s ￿es
c (a∗)=p1. In period 2, Ellen sells a∗ to Frank in states eB, eB
CB, eG
2 ,a n deG
3 and
Frank sells a∗ to Ellen in states fB, fB
CB, fG
2 ,a n dfG
3 .
PROOF: See Appendix A.
Note that conditions symmetrical to (13), (14) and (15) follow automatically from
the symmetries in (8). These conditions have the following interpretations:
Condition (13) says that, in period 1, Ellen bids up the price, p1, to the same levels
at information sets EB
Seller = {b, bCB,e B,e B
CB},a n dEG
Seller = {eG
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 }.T h i s
condition is necessary so that bad Ellen pools with good Ellen, i.e., Ellen￿s behavior in
period 1 does not reveal to buyer Frank whether she is good or bad. This requires a
coincidence between diﬀerent shadow state prices for Ellen, so this equilibrium is not
robust to variations in model parameters (but see Subsection 3.A below).
Condition (14) says that future seller Ellen bids ￿rst period price p1 up more at
information set EG
Seller = {eG
1 , eG
2 , eG
3 } (and so, also at EB
Seller = {b, bCB,e B,e B
CB})
than does future buyer Frank at his overlapping information set FBuyer = {eB, eB
CB,
eG
1 , eG
2 , eG
3 }. This requires Frank to initially be more concerned about falling prices
than good seller Ellen. Frank is then short-sale constrained in period 1 at FBuyer,s o
his preferences do not aﬀect the market price. This is necessary so that bad seller Ellen,
at EB
Seller = {b, bCB,e B,e B
CB}, cannot tell whether Frank is a buyer at FBuyer,o ra
bad seller at FB
Seller = {b, bCB,f B,f B
CB}.
Finally, condition (15) says that, in period 2, Frank, at information set FBuyer2 =
{eB,e B
CB,e G
2 ,e G
3 }, is willing to buy from good Ellen, at her information set EG
Seller2 =
{eG
2 ,e G
3 },e v e nt h o u g hF r a n kt h i n k st h a tE l l e nm ight be a bad seller at information set
EB
Seller2 = {eB,e B
CB}. This requires there to be strictly positive gains from trade be-
21tween Frank and good Ellen, which requires Frank to put more weight on the dividend-
paying state, eG
3 , than does good Ellen, so MF(eG
3 )/MF(eG
2 ) >M E(eG
3 )/ME(eG
2 ). For
example, Frank might expect very low future labor income in the dividend paying state
eG
3 ,a n ds o ,m a yc o n s i d e rt h ea s s e tt ob eag o o dhedge against his future labor income,
while Ellen may consider the asset to be a bad hedge against her future labor income.
Thus, when these conditions are met, future sellers bid p1 up to (16) in the ￿rst
period, and buyers bid p2 up to (17) in the second period, and purchase at that price.15
As discussed at the end of the next subsection, there is also a second nonbubble
equilibrium, with price always zero in states b, bCB, eB, eB
CB, fB,a n dfB
CB.
2.B. Policy Analysis
We now examine the welfare eﬀects of a policy of ￿general de￿a t i o no fo v e r p r i c e d
assets.￿ Recall that bCB, eB
CB,a n dfB
CB are states where the central bank knows
the asset is worthless, and assume now that the central bank announces whether ω
is one of these states. The announcement is made before production, so central bank
announcements ￿ or their absence ￿ can in￿uence agents￿ production decisions. We
analyze how this policy aﬀects an agent￿s welfare in her diﬀerent interim situations ￿
good seller, bad seller, or buyer. We also analyze her ex ante expected utility, i.e., from
the viewpoint of an agent who has not yet received any information, so she does not
know whether she is a good seller, a bad seller, or a buyer.
Let 0 < λ < 1 be a parameter indicating the probability that the central bank
knows the asset is overpriced, if at least one private agent knows this. Speci￿cally, let
π(bCB)=λπ (b, bCB), π(eB
CB)=λπ (eB,e B
CB), π(fB
CB)=λπ (fB,f B
CB). (18)
15 In terms of their roles in our discussion, (13) is not needed in richer models (see
Subsection 3.A), while (14) assures that trade occurs in period 2, not period 1, and
(15) generates a motive for trade in period 2.
22Also, to simplify the analysis, assume that the states b and bCB,e t c ,a r ei d e n t i c a l
in terms of marginal utilities, so MUk(b)=MUk(bCB), MUk(eB)=MUk(eB
CB), and
MUk(fB)=MUk(fB
CB), for k = E, F. This, combined with (18), implies that
Mk(bCB)=λ Mk(b, bCB),M k(eB
CB)=λ Mk(eB,e B
CB), and
Mk(fB
CB)=λ Mk(fB,f B
CB), for k = E, F.
(19)
Suppose the central bank follows a policy of de￿ating overpriced assets, so it
announces whether or not the state is one of bCB, eB
CB,o rfB
CB. Suppose also that the
public understands this policy. Then, if the central bank announces bCB, eB
CB or fB
CB,
it becomes common knowledge that the asset is worthless, and the price collapses.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the central bank turns out not to announce bCB,
eB
CB or fB
CB. This is equivalent to announcing that the true state is not bCB, eB
CB
or fB
CB. This reduces the probability of a bubble, where both know that the asset
is worthless, by a factor of 1 − λ,f r o mπ(b, bCB)t oπ(b). It also reduces, by the
same factor, 1 − λ, the probability that Ellen alone knows the asset is worthless, from
π(eB,e B
CB)t oπ(eB), and similarly for Frank.
Thus, given that there is at least one bad seller who knows the asset is worthless,
the central bank￿s information is not correlated with the number of bad sellers who
know this. The next section considers the opposite extreme ￿ bubble bursting ￿ where
the central bank￿s information is highly co r r e l a t e dw i t ht h en u m b e ro fb a ds e l l e r s .
Since the central bank￿s information is uncorrelated with whether one versus two
sellers are bad in this section, the central bank￿s announcement policy does not in￿uence
a bad seller￿s probability assessment of whether other agents are bad sellers. The central
bank￿s policy therefore does not aﬀect bad sellers￿ con￿dence levels, so bad sellers
continue to pool with good sellers, and an equilibrium like the one in Proposition 1
continues to exist, as shown in Proposition 2.
23PROPOSITION 2: If shadow state prices satisfy (19) for some λ between zero
and one, then, under a policy of general de￿ation of overpriced assets, an equilibrium
like that in Proposition 1 continues to exist, but with p1(ω)=0a tω = bCB, eB
CB and
fB
CB,w i t hp2(ω)=0a tω = eB
CB and fB
CB, and with (17) replaced by
p2 =
MF(eG
3 )
MF(eB,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
d. (17 )
PROOF: First, equations (13) and (19) above imply that
ME(eG
2 ,e G
3 )
ME(eG
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
=
ME(eB)
ME(b, eB)
, (13 )
since (19) implies that the right hand side of (13 ) equals the right hand side of (13). Bad
sellers therefore continue to pool with good sellers. Also, the analogue of (14) continues
to hold if eB
CB is removed, since the right hand side becomes smaller. Similarly, the
analogue of (15) continues to hold, since the left hand side becomes bigger. QED
Thus, a bubble equilibrium continues to exist in the presence of a policy of general
de￿ation of overpriced assets. This policy rule has four major eﬀects:
(a) In those states where an overpriced asset is de￿ated, producers do not waste
resources producing the asset. This improves welfare.
(b) Bad sellers, who know the asset is worthless, cannot sell the asset if the central
bank reveals it to be worthless. This hurts bad sellers, but helps buyers.
(c) In states where the central bank does not make a price de￿ating announcement,
buyers become more con￿dent that the asset is valuable, so they bid up p2,s op1 also
rises. This helps sellers but hurts buyers.
(d) Eﬀect (c) encourages production in states where the central bank does nothing.
Eﬀects (b) and (c) are pure ￿transfer eﬀects,￿ while (a) and (d) in￿uence produc-
tion. For buyers, these eﬀects must perfectly cancel, since their demand is in￿nitely
elastic, so their expected consumer surplus remains constant at zero. For sellers, these
24eﬀects may not cancel. The lower probability of selling worthless assets (eﬀect (b))
hurts sellers, but the higher price (eﬀect (c)) helps them. Thus, seller welfare could
rise or fall. However, suppose transfer eﬀects (b) and (c) exactly cancel. Then we will
show that the improved allocation of production (less output in bad-seller states, from
eﬀect (a), more output in remaining states, from eﬀe c t( d ) )h e l p sw e l f a r e .
Thus, consider Ellen￿s expected utility. Since her elasticity of demand is in￿nite in
all states where she buys, her expected consumer surplus is zero in those states, whether
the policy is in eﬀect or not. Thus, her expected bene￿t from this market comes from
pro￿ts in states where she produces. Since, by (16), she is indiﬀerent between selling
her output in period 1 and holding it for period 2, we can imagine, when calculating
her expected utility, that she sells her output in period 1. Also, her pro￿t from states
where she produces is p1a∗(p1) − c(a∗(p1)) = Π(p1).
We must compare her expected welfare with no de￿ation policy (NDP)t ot h a t
with de￿ation policy (DP). Denote the value of p1 in these two cases as pNDP
1 and
pDP
1 , respectively. Then using (16), (17) and (17 ),
pDP
1
pNDP
1
=
MF(eB,e B
CB,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
MF(eB,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
, (20)
so pDP
1 >p NDP
1 . This yields eﬀect (c) above.
In the no-de￿ation-policy case, Ellen produces in states b, bCB, eB, eB
CB, eG
1 , eG
2 ,
and eG
3 , so her expected welfare from this market is
EUNDP
E = Π(pNDP
1 )ME(b, bCB,e B,e B
CB,e G
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 ). (21)
On the other hand, in the de￿ation-policy case, she produces only in states b, eB, eG
1 ,
eG
2 ,a n deG
3 , so her expected welfare becomes
EUDP
E = Π(pDP
1 )ME(b, eB,e G
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 ). (22)
25To isolate transfer eﬀects (b) and (c), consider ￿rst the case of a ￿xed endowment
e,s oΠ(p1)=ep1. Proposition 3 determines the welfare eﬀect of policy in this case.
PROPOSITION 3: In the ￿xed endowment case, general de￿a t i o no fo v e r p r i c e d
assets increases agents￿ expected welfare if and only if
ME(eB
CB)
ME(eB,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
<
MF(eB
CB)
MF(eB,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
. (23)
PROOF: See Appendix B.
Proposition 3 says that, for the ￿xed endowment case, the welfare of Ellen, say,
will increase with a policy of general de￿ation of overpriced assets if Ellen attaches less
weight to {eB
CB} relative to {eB,e G
2 ,e G
3 } than does Frank. Of course, in the opposite
case the central bank￿s information revelation hurts expected welfare.16
This may be understood as follows. First, in the ￿xed endowment case, eﬀects (a)
and (d) above go away, so just eﬀects (b) and (c) remain. The policy then hurts Ellen
but helps Frank in state eB
CB, since it prevents Ellen from selling Frank a worthless
asset in that state. On the other hand, the policy helps Ellen but hurts Frank by
raising the price in states eB, eG
2 and eG
3 . For Frank, these eﬀects must cancel, to keep
his overall consumer surplus constant at zero. Thus, Ellen bene￿ts on average if, as in
(23), she puts less weight, relative to Frank, on state eB
CB,w h e r es h es u ﬀers, than on
states eB, eG
2 and eG
3 ,w h e r es h eb e n e ￿ts. That is, if (23) holds, policy transfers wealth
from Ellen to Frank when Frank￿s marginal utility of consumption is relatively high,
a n df r o mF r a n kt oE l l e nw h e nE l l e n ￿ sm a r g i n a lutility of consumption is relatively high.
Finally, conditions (13) through (15) in Proposition 1 do not force inequality (23)
to go either way, since they say nothing about how much weight Ellen puts on her good
states, eG
2 and eG
3 , relative to her bad state, eB
CB.
16 This eﬀect is related to that discussed in Hirshleifer (1972), p. 568, where infor-
mation revelation disrupts insurance markets.
26Next take as a baseline the case where shadow state prices are chosen to eliminate
transfer eﬀects, so policy has no eﬀect on expected welfare under ￿xed endowments.
This is analogous to the standard practice of ignoring pure lump sum transfers in
consumer/producer surplus analysis. In this case, (21) equals (22) for Π(p1)=ep1,s o
Baseline Case :
pDP
1
pNDP
1
=
ME(b, bCB,e B,e B
CB,e G
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
ME(b, eB,e G
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
. (24)
Suppose (24) holds. Then, in the case where production is possible, a policy of general
de￿a t i o no fo v e r p r i c e da s s e t si m p r o v e sw e l f a r e ,a ss h o w ni nP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose shadow state prices are such that a policy of gen-
eral de￿a t i o no fo v e r p r i c e da s s e t sd o e sn o ta ﬀect overall expected welfare in the ￿xed
endowment case. Then if production is possible, so the supply curve a∗(p1)i su p w a r d
sloping, a policy of general de￿a t i o no fo v e r p r i c e da s s e t sw i l li n c r e a s ew e l f a r e .
PROOF: First, by Hotelling￿s Lemma, Π (p1)=a∗(p1) so, since a∗(p1) is increas-
ing in p1, the function Π(p1) is strictly convex. Also, Π(0) = 0 (since c(0) = 0). Thus,
since pDP
1 >p NDP
1 , it follows that Π(pDP
1 )/Π(pNDP
1 ) >p DP
1 /pNDP
1 .F r o m t h i s a n d
(24) it follows that (22) is bigger than (21). QED
Intuitively, if (24) holds, so there is no transfer eﬀect, then the only remaining
welfare consequence of the price-de￿ation policy is better production decisions. This
improvement has two aspects. First, since the central bank sometimes reveals when the
asset is worthless, bad sellers waste less resources producing worthless assets (eﬀect (a)).
Second, in those states where the central bank makes no announcement, the lemons
problem is reduced, so producers can produce more con￿dently (eﬀect (d)).
Up to now, we have focused on the case where the policy rule shifts the economy
from one bubble equilibrium to another. However, a nonbubble equilibrium also con-
tinues to exist in the presence of the policy, with price equal to zero in states b, bCB,
eB, eB
CB, fB,a n dfB
CB. While we cannot determine which equilibrium will prevail, the
27above framework allows us to analyze the eﬀe c to ft h ep o l i c yi ne a c hc a s e ,r e g a r d l e s s
of whether the policy shifts the market into or out of a bubble equilibrium. This is
because a nonbubble equilibrium is identical to the equilibrium in Proposition 2, but
with λ =1( s ot h ec e n t r a lb a n ka l w a y sd e ￿ates an asset someone knows is overpriced).
For example, if the policy shifts the market from a bubble to a nonbubble equilibrium,
the eﬀe c ti sa si nP r o p o s i t i o n s2t h r o u g h4 ,b u tw i t hλ =1 ,s ot h ee ﬀect is stronger.
If the policy shifts the market from a nonbubble to a bubble equilibrium, the eﬀect is
reversed ￿l i k ereducing λ from λ0 =1t os o m eλ1 < 1, and so on.
Of course, the fact that policy may shift the economy between bubble and non-
bubble equilibria is important, since it may help to explain why policy sometimes has
such unpredictable eﬀects on asset markets.
In any case, unless a policy of general de￿ation of overpriced assets causes the
economy to shift from a nonbubble to a bubble equilibrium, it improves production
allocation decisions. This policy will therefore be bene￿cial overall unless the transfer
eﬀect is negative. By contrast, a bubble bursting policy is likely to worsen production
allocation decisions, as shown next.
3. BURSTING BUBBLES AND THE LEMONS PROBLEM
3.A. Comment on Robustness
T h ea b o v ee q u i l i b r i aw e r en o tr o b u s ts i n c e they required the coincidence (13).
However, this is not an inescapable problem in this kind of bubble model. Instead, it
is simply the price we pay for the convenience of a ￿nite state space.
The coincidence in (13) causes the bad seller to pool with the good seller, and
slight variations in parameters can break this coincidence. However, if we allow for a
continuum of diﬀerent types of good and bad sellers, then it becomes possible for each
type of bad seller to pool with some t y p eo fg o o ds e l l e r ,e v e ni ft h ep a r a m e t e r so ft h e
model vary. Details are available upon request.
28This is relevant for bubble bursting policies, since these policies would break the
coincidence in (13). However, we do not want the eﬀect of the policy to be driven solely
by the lack of robustness of our ￿nite state space model. Thus, we must increase the
robustness of the model. However, to keep the modi￿ed model as simple as possible,
we consider a ￿nite state extension that is only slightly more complicated than the
previous model. Speci￿cally, we still assume one type of bad seller, but allow for two
t y p e so fg o o ds e l l e r ,al o w - c o n ￿dence type and a high-con￿dence type.
It then turns out that, in states where the central bank does not actually make an
announcement, the presence of a bubble bursting policy rule increases the con￿dence
of bad sellers. We therefore choose parameters such that bad sellers pool with low-
con￿dence good sellers in the absence of the policy, but with high-con￿dence good
sellers if the policy rule is in place.
3.B. Basic Setup and Equilibrium
The previous section examined a policy where the central bank de￿ates asset prices
when some agents know the asset is worthless, even if others do not. However, central
banks may know less about fundamentals than all private agents in the economy. For
example, the central bank may only learn that an asset is overpriced in states where all
other agents already know this, so the asset is in an Allen et al. (1993) strong bubble.
The policy then becomes one of bursting bubbles. This section shows that such a
policy protects bad sellers from each other, so they can more con￿dently exploit buyers.
For consider a bad seller who knows the asset is worthless. She also knows that, if the
asset is in a bubble, then the central bank might announce this. Thus, if the central
bank makes no announcement, she becomes more con￿dent that she is not in a bubble.
That is, she becomes more con￿dent that some other agent does not know the asset
is worthless, so she can sell him the asset. She therefore more closely mimics those
among the good sellers who are con￿dent that the asset is valuable. This exacerbates
29the lemons problem faced by the more con￿dent of the good sellers, which distorts
production decisions. In short, while general de￿a t i o no fo v e r p r i c e da s s e t st e n d st o
improve production decisions, a bubble bursting policy may hurt production decisions.
This analysis requires a modi￿cation of the above bubble model. As explained in
the previous subsection, we need to posit two diﬀerent types of good seller, with two
diﬀerent con￿dence levels. Bad sellers can then pool with low-con￿dence good sellers if
there is no bubble-bursting policy, and pool with high-con￿dence good sellers if there
is a bubble bursting policy. If bad sellers could not pool with good sellers, asset prices
would collapse, and there would be no bubble.
Let the two con￿dence levels for the good types of seller be L,f o rl o wc o n ￿dence,
and H, for high con￿dence, and let the states of the world be
Ω = {b, bCB,e B,f B,e G
1L,e G
2L,e G
3L,f G
1L,f G
2L,f G
3L,
eG
1H,e G
2H,e G
3H,f G
1H,f G
2H,f G
3H}.
(25)
The asset pays dividend d(ω)=d in states ω = eG
3L, fG
3L, eG
3H,a n dfG
3H,a n dz e r o
otherwise. Ellen can produce quantity a of the asset, at cost c(a), in the states b, bCB,
eB,a n dt h eeG
iI states, i =1 , 2, 3,I= L, H, and symmetrically for Frank. Any
announcements again occur before production, so central bank announcements, or lack
thereof, can in￿uence agents￿ production decisions.
Suppose that, in the ￿rst period, and prior to the central bank announcement,
Ellen has four information sets:
EB
Seller = {b, bCB,e B},E LG
Seller = {eG
1L,e G
2L,e G
3L},E HG
Seller = {eG
1H,e G
2H,e G
3H}
EBuyer = {fB,f G
1L,f G
2L,f G
3L,f G
1H,f G
2H,f G
3H},
and symmetrically for Frank. Here EB
Seller is Ellen￿s ￿bad seller￿ information set,
ELG
Seller her ￿low-con￿dence good seller￿ information set, EHG
Seller her ￿high-con￿dence
30good seller￿ information set, and EBuyer h e r￿ b u y e r ￿i n f o r m a t i o ns e t . I np e r i o d2 ,
the states b, bCB, eG
1L, eG
1H, fG
1L,a n dfG
1H are revealed to all players. In period 3, all
information is revealed and any dividends are paid.
Below, ￿high con￿dence￿ will mean that
ME(eG
2H,e G
3H)
ME(eG
1H,e G
2H,e G
3H)
>
ME(eG
2L,e G
3L)
ME(eG
1L,e G
2L,e G
3L)
. (26)
This means that, in the ￿rst period, high-con￿dence good sellers attach greater weight
to states with positive second period price than do low-con￿dence good sellers.
As in Section 2, assume symmetry between Ellen and Frank, so ME(b)=MF(b),
ME(bCB)=MF(bCB), ME(eB)=MF(fB), ME(fB)=MF(eB), and, for i =1 ,2 ,3 ,
and I = L, H, ME(eG
iI)=MF(fG
iI), and ME(fG
iI)=MF(eG
iI). We can therefore focus
on the states where Ellen can produce and sell:
ΩE = {b, bCB,e B,e G
1L,e G
2L,e G
3L,e G
1H,e G
2H,e G
3H}. (27)
We want the model to have nice equilibria whether or not the central bank an-
nounces bCB.S p e c i ￿cally, we want a bubble equilibrium to exist where bad sellers pool
with some type of good seller, whether or not a bubble-bursting policy rule is in eﬀect.
The equilibrium structure that works is presented in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 presents
the structure of equilibrium prices without a bubble bursting policy (NP), and Table
3 presents the structure with a bubble bursting policy (BP).
TABLE 2: EQUILIBRIUM PRICES ￿ NO BUBBLE BURSTING POLICY
State b bCB eB eG
1L eG
2L eG
3L eG
1H eG
2H eG
3H fB fG
1L fG
2L fG
3L fG
1H fG
2H fG
3H
t =1 pNP
1L pNP
1L pNP
1L pNP
1L pNP
1L pNP
1L pNP
1H pNP
1H pNP
1H pNP
1L pNP
1L pNP
1L pNP
1L pNP
1H pNP
1H pNP
1H
t =2 0 0 pNP
2L 0 pNP
2L pNP
2L 0 pNP
2H pNP
2H pNP
2L 0 pNP
2L pNP
2L 0 pNP
2H pNP
2H
t =3 0 0 0 0 0 d 0 0 d 0 0 0 d 0 0 d
31TABLE 3: EQUILIBRIUM PRICES ￿ BUBBLE BURSTING POLICY
State b bCB eB eG
1L eG
2L eG
3L eG
1H eG
2H eG
3H fB fG
1L fG
2L fG
3L fG
1H fG
2H fG
3H
t =1 pBP
1H 0 pBP
1H pBP
1L pBP
1L pBP
1L pBP
1H pBP
1H pBP
1H pBP
1H pBP
1L pBP
1L pBP
1L pBP
1H pBP
1H pBP
1H
t =2 0 0 pBP
2H 0 pBP
2L pBP
2L 0 pBP
2H pBP
2H pBP
2H 0 pBP
2L pBP
2L 0 pBP
2H pBP
2H
t =3 0 0 0 0 0 d 0 0 d 0 0 0 d 0 0 d
Note that the main diﬀerence between Tables 2 and 3 is in the b, bCB, eB,a n d
fB columns. Speci￿cally, bubble bursting reduces the price to zero in state bCB,a n d
causes bad sellers, in states b, eB,a n dfB, to switch from pooling with low-con￿dence
types (so pt = pNP
tL ), to pooling with high-con￿dence types (so pt = pBP
tH ). Note also
that, if pNP
1L  = pNP
1H and pBP
1L  = pBP
1H , then the buyer, by observing p1(ω), can ￿gure
out whether the seller, if good, has high or low con￿dence, so prices reveal information
about seller con￿dence. The prices themselves, and the conditions for these prices to
be an equilibrium, are given in Proposition 5.
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose the following conditions, analogous to conditions
(13) through (15) in Proposition 1, are met:
ME(eG
2L,e G
3L)
ME(eG
1L,e G
2L,e G
3L)
=
ME(eB)
ME(b, bCB,e B)
, (13L)
ME(eG
2H,e G
3H)
ME(eG
1H,e G
2H,e G
3H)
=
ME(eB)
ME(b, eB)
, (13H)
ME(eG
2I,e G
3I)
ME(eG
1I,e G
2I,e G
3I)
≥
MF(eB,e G
2I,e G
3I)
MF(eB,e G
1I,e G
2I,e G
3I)
, (14 )
with I = L, H,a n d
MF(eG
3I)
MF(eB,e G
2I,e G
3I)
≥
ME(eG
3I)
ME(eG
2I,e G
3I)
, (15 )
with I = L, H. Then, if the central bank does not follow a bubble-bursting policy, an
equilibrium exists with prices as in Table 2, where
pNP
1I =
ME(eG
2I,e G
3I)
ME(eG
1I,e G
2I,e G
3I)
pNP
2I ,I = L, H, (16 )
32pNP
2L =
MF(eG
3L)d
MF(eB,e G
2L,e G
3L)
and pNP
2H =
MF(eG
3H)d
MF(eG
2H,e G
3H)
, (17NP)
and where we must also assume that (16 )a n d( 1 7 NP) yield pNP
1L  = pNP
1H ,s op r i c e s
reveal information about good seller con￿dence.
If the central bank does follow a bubble bursting policy, then prices are as in Table
3, with pBP
1I , I = L, H,g i v e nb y( 1 6  ), but with pNP
tI replaced by pBP
tI ,w i t h
pBP
2L =
MF(eG
3L)d
MF(eG
2L,e G
3L)
and pBP
2H =
MF(eG
3H)d
MF(eB,e G
2H,e G
3H)
, (17BP)
and where again we assume that (16 )a n d( 1 7 BP) yield pBP
1L  = pBP
1H .
Finally, Ellen produces a∗(p1(ω)) (where a∗(p1)s a t i s ￿es c (a∗(p1)) = p1), in states
ω = b, bCB, eB,a n dt h eeG
iI states, i =1 , 2, 3,I= L, H, and symmetrically for
Frank, where p1(ω) is given in Table 2 in the no bubble bursting case, and Table 3 in
the bubble bursting case. In period 2, Ellen sells her output to Frank in states ω where
she produced and p2(ω) is positive, and symmetrically for Frank selling to Ellen.
PROOF: Similar to the proof of Proposition 1.
Proposition 5 says that, given conditions (13L), (13H), (14 ), and (15 ), bad sellers
pool with low-con￿dence good sellers in the absence of a bubble bursting policy, but,
in the presence of a bubble-bursting policy, pool with high-con￿dence good sellers if
no announcement is actually made. Thus, bubble bursting policies tend to lead bad
sellers to pool with the more con￿dent of the good sellers.
Condition (13L) is analogous to condition (13) of Proposition 1, except here the
bad seller is pooling with the low-con￿dence good seller when the bad seller thinks the
state might be bCB. Condition (13H)i sa n a l o g o u st o( 1 3 )e x c e p tt h a th e r et h eb a d
seller pools with the high-con￿dence good seller when the bad seller is sure that the
state is not bCB. Comparing the right hand sides of (13L)a n d( 1 3 H) shows that the
weight attached to selling in the second period implied by (13H) is higher than the
33weight implied by (13L), which is consistent with (26). Thus, (13H)a n d( 1 3 L)r e a l l y
do represent con￿dence levels of high and low-con￿dence types, respectively.
Condition (14 ) is analogous to (14) in Proposition 1. It says that good sellers of
each con￿dence level, I = L, H ( a n ds o ,b a ds e l l e r sw h op o o lw i t ht h e m ) ,b i du p￿rst
period price beyond what the buyers are willing to pay, given that buyers do not know
whether sellers are good or bad but can ￿gure out the con￿dence level of sellers if good
(by observing the price). This condition is needed so that the bad sellers, in period 1,
cannot ￿gure out whether they are facing buyers or other bad sellers.
Condition (15 ) is analogous to (15) in Proposition 1. It says that the buyer,
knowing the con￿dence level of the seller if good, is willing to pay more than the good
seller in period 2, even if the buyer believes that the seller might be bad. This assures
that the buyer really does buy from the good seller, even when the bad seller is pooling
with the good seller. Of course, it follows from this that the buyer is even more willing
to buy from the good seller when he is sure that the seller is not bad.
3.C. Welfare Analysis: Bursting of Actual Bubbles
To examine the welfare eﬀects of policy, remember that, since the elasticity of
demand is in￿nite, consumer surplus is zero, so welfare from the market equals expected
producer surplus. Also, as before, sellers are indiﬀerent between selling in periods 1 or
2, so for the purpose of calculating expected welfare, we can imagine that they sell in
period 1. Thus, in the absence of a bubble-bursting policy, Ellen￿s ex ante expected
welfare, averaging over all her information sets, is
Π(pNP
1L ) ME(b, bBC,e B,e G
1L,e G
2L,e G
3L)+Π(pNP
1H ) ME(eG
1H,e G
2H,e G
3H). (28)
Similarly, if the central bank follows a bubble-bursting rule, Ellen￿s welfare will be
Π(pBP
1L ) ME(eG
1L,e G
2L,e G
3L)+Π(pBP
1H ) ME(b, eB,e G
1H,e G
2H,e G
3H). (29)
34These are ex ante expected utilities, from Ellen￿s point of view, before she knows
her own type, etc. We can break this up into contributions to expected utility through
her bad seller type, her low-con￿dence good seller type, and her high-con￿dence good
seller type. Proposition 6 treats the welfare contribution through her bad seller type,
while Propositions 7 and 8 treat the contributions through her two good seller types.
PROPOSITION 6: In the ￿xed endowment case, the bubble bursting policy
will have no eﬀect on the expected welfare of bad sellers if and only if policy does not
aﬀect the actual second period sales price received by bad sellers, so pNP
2L = pBP
2H .I n
this case, the bubble bursting policy helps bad sellers when production is possible.
PROOF: See Appendix C.
Thus, if the transfer eﬀect alone does not hurt bad sellers, then a bubble-bursting
policy helps them. This is because the central bank bursts bubbles in states where
bad sellers would not be able to sell anyway. The policy therefore does not aﬀect the
ex ante probability that bad sellers actually se l lt h e i ra s s e t s .I to n l yg i v e st h e ms o m e
information, before production, about whether they will be able to sell the asset. Thus,
if the policy does not aﬀect the actual sale price, its only eﬀect is to allow bad sellers
to make better informed production decisions.
We now turn to the eﬀect on high and low-con￿dence types of good seller. Since
the bubble bursting policy causes bad types of seller to pool with high, rather than
low-con￿dence types of good seller, bubble bursting helps low-con￿dence good sellers,
but hurts high-con￿dence good sellers, as shown in the following Proposition:
PROPOSITION 7: A bubble-bursting policy helps low-con￿dence types of good
seller, but hurts high-con￿dence types of good seller.
PROOF: Obvious, since pBP
1L >p NP
1L and pBP
1H <p NP
1H (compare (17BP)t o( 1 7 NP)
and use (16 )). QED
Proposition 7 raises the question of which of the two eﬀects ￿ higher welfare for
35low-con￿dence good sellers, or lower welfare for high-con￿dence good sellers ￿ dom-
inates. Of course, if agents put much more weight on their high-con￿dence types
(ME(eG
1H,e G
2H,e G
3H)   ME(eG
1L,e G
2L,e G
3L)), then a bubble-bursting policy will hurt
good sellers on average, and visa versa. The transfer eﬀect is therefore straightforward.
To focus on production distortions, we choose weights so that the transfer eﬀects
on high and low-con￿dence good sellers perfectly cancel in the ￿xed endowment case.
When we do this, we ￿nd that the negative production eﬀects for high-con￿dence good
s e l l e r st e n dt od o m i n a t ew h e np r o d u c t i o ni sp o s s i b l e .
PROPOSITION 8: Suppose the shadow prices, ME(ω)a n dMF(ω), are such
that, in the ￿xed endowment case, overall expected welfare of good sellers is unaﬀected
by a bubble bursting policy. Suppose also that the greater con￿dence of the high-
con￿d e n c eg o o ds e l l e r si ss u ﬃcient so that
pBP
1H >p NP
1L and pNP
1H >p BP
1L . (30)
Then, in the production case, the negative eﬀect of the bubble bursting policy on high-
con￿dence types dominates the positive eﬀect of the policy on low-con￿dence types, so
the overall expected eﬀect of the bubble bursting policy on good sellers is negative.
PROOF: See Appendix D.
The ￿rst half of (30) compares p1 for high-con￿dence good sellers to p1 for low-
con￿dence good sellers, given that, in both cases, the bad seller is pooling with the
good seller. Similarly, the second half of (30) compares p1 for high-con￿dence versus
low-con￿dence good sellers, given that the bad seller is not pooling with the good
seller. Thus, both halves state that, holding all else equal in the appropriate sense,
high-con￿dence good sellers bid p1 up higher than low-con￿dence good sellers, which
makes sense.
Combining Propositions 6 and 8, a bubble bursting policy tends to improve pro-
duction decisions for bad sellers, but distort production decisions for good sellers, by
36shifting the lemons problem from low to high-con￿dence good sellers. Intuitively, a
bubble is a situation where bad sellers are hurting other bad sellers, and this interferes
with their ability to exploit buyers. Thus, a bubble bursting policy, by protecting bad
sellers from each other, allows them to more con￿dently exploit buyers. This exacer-
bates the lemons problem faced by the more con￿dent of the good sellers. While the
overall eﬀe c ti sa m b i g u o u s ,o n ec a nq u e s t i o nt h ev a l u eo fap o l i c yw h o s em a i nb e n e ￿t
is to help bad sellers to more eﬃciently exploit uninformed buyers.
In summary, bubbles tend to exist in environments of asymmetric information.
This asymmetric information hurts welfare by creating a lemons problem. However,
the most extreme symptom of this asymmetric information ￿ the bubble ￿ does not,
itself, necessarily hurt welfare. Thus, curing the symptom may make the underlying
problem worse.
4 .W E L F A R EW I T HI R R A T I O N A LI N V E S T O R S
The above assumed that all agents were rational. However, the analysis can easily
be extended to certain types of irrationality. In particular, while trade in the above
model was induced by a hedging motive, it may be more plausible to assume that
trade is driven by overcon￿dence, as in Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). In this case,
the shadow prices ME(ω)a n dMF(ω)m a yd i ﬀer, not because marginal utilities diﬀer,
but because probabilities diﬀer, as in Allen et al. (1993) and Conlon (2004).
However, if agents are irrational, it is not clear how to measure welfare. One could
measure welfare according to the policy maker￿s supposedly true model, yielding what
we might call (following De Long et al., 1989, p. 690), a ￿paternalistic￿ approach to
welfare analysis. Alternatively, one could measure the welfare of each agent according
to that agent￿s own possibly mistaken model (see, e.g., Diamond, 1967, p. 762).
T h ep r e s e n tp a p e ri sm o r ei nl i n ew i t ht his second approach. Indeed, if shadow
prices diﬀer because probability beliefs diﬀer, then Pareto improvements in the present
37framework become Pareto improvements with each agent￿s welfare evaluated using that
agent￿s own probabilities, rather than any true probabilities. If policy is evaluated from
this point of view, then all the above results go through exactly as before.
Of course, if one prefers to measure welfare according to the policy maker￿s proba-
bilities, then there might be a stronger argument for protecting buyers from bad sellers.
On the other hand, if investors are overcon￿dent, then lemons problems may be a good
thing, since they may make buyers less con￿dent, and so, may reduce mispricing caused
by overcon￿dence. In any case, one cannot understand the eﬀects of asset de￿ation
policies without tracing the eﬀects of these policies on the lemons problem.
I na d d i t i o n ,e v e ni fo n em o d e l so v e r c o n ￿dent or otherwise irrational agents, there
is nevertheless a role for asymmetric information in bubble models. Even overcon￿-
dent agents may realize that they have something to learn from the opinions of other
i n v e s t o r s ,a n dt h i st y p eo fi n f o r m a t i o nl e a k a g eb e t w e e ni n v e s t o r sm a yp l a yac r u c i a l
role in market booms and crashes (Doblas-Madrid, 2008, Kai and Conlon, 2008).
5. CONCLUSION AND POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS
This paper analyzes bubble-bursting policy in the context of an Allen et al. (1993)
greater fool bubble model. This allows us to study greater fool bubbles in a framework
with rational agents, which, in turn, allows us to separate the role of policy as respond-
ing to distorted incentives from the role of policy as protecting agents from their own
irrationality. Of course, the case of agent irrationality is also important.
The main lesson of this study is that, while asymmetric information is bad (since
it creates a lemons problem), and asymmetric information tends to create bubbles,
bubbles themselves are not necessarily bad. Thus, a policy which reduces the adverse
eﬀects of asymmetric information on uninformed buyers, such as general de￿ation of
overpriced assets, may be a good thing, but a policy which protects bad sellers from
each other, such as the bursting of actual bubbles, may be harmful.
38Since this paper provides only a ￿rst look at policy in asymmetric information
bubble models, it is obviously incomplete in important ways. One obvious extension
is to consider what happens if the central bank mistakenly tries to de￿ate the price of
an asset which is not, in fact, overpriced. The eﬀect of the policy then clearly depends
on how much investors trust the central bank￿s judgment (Kai and Conlon, 2008).
Second, it would be useful to incorporate a richer model of the monetary policy
instrument, speci￿cally, eﬀects through open market operations. Of course, given the
importance of asymmetric information in the present framework, information will be
an important part of any transmission mechanism. For example, an interest rate hike
may be necessary to credibly signal the Fed￿s skepticism to the market.
A third extension would be to examine a model with more periods. This would
allow us to analyze delayed policy, and the eﬀects of expected future announcements on
current resource allocation. For example, in the above framework, any bubbles already
exist in the ￿rst period, and the central bank either does or does not de￿ate overpriced
assets right away. In contrast, one could imagine a model where, as prices gradually
rise, more and more investors come to realize that the asset is overpriced, as in Abreu
and Brunnermeier (2003). In this case, early action by the central bank would de￿ate
prices before all agents knew they were overpriced, as in general de￿ation of overpriced
a s s e t s ,w h i l ed e l a y e da c t i o nw o u l dm e a nt h eb u r s t i n go fa na c t u a ls t r o n gb u b b l e . I t
w o u l db ei n t e r e s t i n gt os e eh o wt h ea b o v ec o nclusions change when carried over to this
more complicated environment.
Finally, future work should vary the information structure, and also modify the
assumption that the elasticity of demand for the asset is in￿nite. In addition, the
potential consequences of investor risk aversion should be examined more seriously.
39APPENDIX A: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Start with period 2. Equation (17) uses Frank￿s version of (3) to give Frank￿s
willingness to pay for the asset at information set FBuyer2 = {eB,e B
CB,e G
2 ,e G
3 },g i v e n
the asset only pays a dividend (of d) in state eG
3 . Inequality (15) says that Ellen, at
her information set EG
Seller2 = {eG
2 ,e G
3 }, values the asset less than Frank at FBuyer2.
Ellen also values the asset less at her other information set EB
Seller2 = {eB,e B
CB},s i n c e
at that information set, Ellen knows that the asset is worthless. Thus, Ellen is willing
to sell at the price p2 from (17) in the states eB, eB
CB, eG
2 ,a n deG
3 ,a n dF r a n kb i d st h e
price up to exactly that value in those state s .B ys y m m e t r y ,t h es a m ep r i c ea p p l i e sa t
states fB, fB
CB fG
2 ,a n dfG
3 . At the other states, b, bCB, eG
1 ,a n dfG
1 , it is common
knowledge in period 2 that the asset is worthless, so p2(ω)m u s tb ez e r oi nt h o s es t a t e s .
In period 1, the price p1 from (16) gives Ellen￿s willingness to pay at her informa-
tion set EG
Seller = {eG
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 }, by (4). Equation (13) says that Ellen has the same
willingness to pay at EB
Seller = {b, bCB,e B,e B
CB}. Meanwhile, (14) says that Frank
is willing to pay less than this at his information set FBuyer = {eB,e B
CB,e G
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 }
(where he is short sale constrained at zero), while at the information set FB
Seller =
{b, bCB,f B,f B
CB}, Frank is willing to pay exactly p1 by symmetry. Thus, at the
states b, bCB, eB, eB
CB, eG
1 , eG
2 ,a n deG
3 , Ellen bids the price up to p1 in (16), and Frank
i sw i l l i n gt op a yl e s st h a no re q u a lt ot h i sa t these states. A similar argument applies
to fB, fB
CB, fG
1 , fG
2 ,a n dfG
3 .
T h u s ,i nb o t hp e r i o d s1a n d2 ,t h ep r i c eis bid up to the highest willingness to
pay, and the other side is either indiﬀerent to trade or short-sale constrained at the
equilibrium trade. Also, each period￿s price is constant on that period￿s information
sets, so the price reveals no new information. The volume of output and trade also
reveal no new information. This therefore yields an equilibrium. QED
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PROOF: Using Π(p1)=ep1 shows that (22) is bigger than (21) when
ME(b, bCB,e B,e B
CB,e G
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
ME(b, eB,e G
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
<
pDP
1
pNDP
1
=
MF(eB,e B
CB,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
MF(eB,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
,
where the last step uses (20). Subtracting one from the left and right hand sides gives
ME(bCB,e B
CB)
ME(b, eB,e G
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
<
MF(eB
CB)
MF(eB,e G
2 ,e G
3 )
. (B1)
Finally, the left hand side of (B1 )e q u a l st h el e f th a n ds i d eo f( 2 3 ) ,s i n c et h en u m e r -
ator and denominator both diﬀe rb yt h es a m ef a c t o r ,ME(eB
CB)/ME(bCB,e B
CB)=
ME(eB)/ME(b, eB)( b y( 1 9 ) )=ME(eG
2 ,e G
3 )/ME(eG
1 ,e G
2 ,e G
3 )( b y( 1 3  )). QED
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
The bubble-bursting policy causes the contribution to welfare through the bad
types of seller to change from
EUNP
B = Π(pNP
1L )ME(b, bBC,e B)t oEUBP
B = Π(pBP
1H )ME(b, eB). (C1)
In the ￿xed endowment case, Π(p1)=ep1,s o( 1 6  )a n d( 1 3 L) show that EUNP
B =
ep NP
2L ME(eB). Similarly, by (16 )a n d( 1 3 H), EUBP
B = ep BP
2H ME(eB). Thus, EUNP
B
= EUBP
B (so the policy rule does not aﬀect bad sellers￿ average welfare) if and only if
pNP
2L = pBP
2H , that is, if and only if bubble policy does not aﬀect bad sellers￿ p2.
Next, if bubble bursting has no eﬀe c to nb a ds e l l e rw e l f a r ei nt h e￿xed endowment
case, then pNP
1L ME(b, bBC,e B)=pBP
1H ME(b, eB), so
pBP
1H /pNP
1L = ME(b, bBC,e B)/ME(b, eB). (C2)
This implies that pBP
1H >p NP
1L .T h u s ,s i n c eΠ(p1)i ss t r i c t l yc o n v e xi nt h ep r o d u c -
tion case, and Π(0) = 0, it follows that Π(pBP
1H )/Π(pNP
1L ) >p BP
1H /pNP
1L .T h i s ,c o m b i n e d
with (C2), shows that EUBP
B is larger than EUNP
B in this case. QED
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Let AL = ME(eG
1L,e G
2L,e G
3L)a n dAH = ME(eG
1H,e G
2H,e G
3H). Then if the overall
expected welfare of good sellers is unaﬀected by a bubble bursting policy in the ￿xed
endowment case, this means that ALpNP
1L + AHpNP
1H = ALpBP
1L + AHpBP
1H ,s o
AL[pBP
1L − pNP
1L ]=AH[pNP
1H − pBP
1H ]. (D1)
Let
δL =
Π(pBP
1L ) − Π(pNP
1L )
pBP
1L − pNP
1L
and δH =
Π(pNP
1H ) − Π(pBP
1H )
pNP
1H − pBP
1H
. (D2)
Since production is possible, Π(p1) is strictly convex. This, combined with pBP
1L >
pNP
1L , pNP
1H >p BP
1H , and (30) implies that δH > δL.T h u s ,
AL[Π(pBP
1L ) − Π(pNP
1L )] = ALδL[pBP
1L − pNP
1L ]=AHδL[pNP
1H − pBP
1H ]
<A HδH[pNP
1H − pBP
1H ]=AH[Π(pNP
1H ) − Π(pBP
1H )].
(D3)
Here the ￿rst step follows from the de￿nition of δL and the second step follows from
(D1). The third step follows since pNP
1H − pBP
1H > 0 (by Proposition 7) and δL < δH,
and the fourth step uses the de￿nition of δH.I n e q u a l i t y( D3) then shows that
ALΠ(pBP
1L )+AHΠ(pBP
1H ) <A LΠ(pNP
1L )+AHΠ(pNP
1H ),
so the bubble bursting policy reduces the overall expected welfare of the good sellers
in the production case. QED
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